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DUE PROCESS
N.Y. CONST. art. L § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall ... be deprived of lfe, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1:
No State shall.. . deprive to any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Brycel
(decided May 7, 1996)
The defendant, Blaine Bryce, was convicted of second-
degree murder of his son under conditions demonstrating a
depraved indifference to human life. 2 The defendant appealed
the Appellate Division's order denying his motion to set aside the
conviction of murder in the second degree without a hearing. 3
The defendant claimed that the prosecution's actions in failing to
preserve and give over Brady materials was a violation of his
constitutional right guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the
Federal4 and New York State5 Constitutions. 6 The New York
1. 88 N.Y.2d 124, 666 N.E.2d 221, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1996).
2. Id. at 126, 666 N.E.2d 222, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516, citing New York
Penal Law § 125.25[2]. The cause of death was recorded as a brain
hemorrhage due to a fracture in the skull. Id.
3. Id. at 126, 666 N.E.2d at 221, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life.
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id.
753
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State Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate
division and ruled that a hearing be held to ascertain whether the
district attorney misrepresented that the human tissue had been
preserved and was available for analysis, whether it constituted
Brady material, and, if so, whether a new trial was required. 7
The defendant's son died following an extensive brain
hemorrhage due to a fractured skull. 8 The cause of death was
determined by two coroner's pathological reports and a third
report by the state police forensic team pathologist. 9  The
prosecution attempted to show that the defendant caused the
infant's death by inflicting injuries upon him.10 The defendant,
however, claimed that he accidentally dropped the child while
caring for him. 11
Medical experts for the prosecution testified that the
fracture to the skull was of a similar nature to an injury that
would occur had a body been dropped from the second story of a
building. 12 The prosecution's expert witnesses concluded that
the fracture and resulting hemorrhage were the result of
"excessive blows to the head." 13  The defendant's medical
experts testified that there was no evidence of a fracture to the
skull based on examinations of autopsy reports, CAT scans and
x-rays. 14
The defendant was promised by the prosecution that
samples of brain tissue and the skull would be made available for
expert examination. 15 The only physical evidence provided,
however, was a piece of bone that the prosecution represented to
5. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
6. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d at 128, 666 N.E.2d at 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 126, 666 N.E.2d at 222, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
9. Id. at 124, 666 N.E.2d at 222, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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be from the fractured area of the skull and other body tissue from
organs unrelated to the injuries that may have caused the death. 16
The prosecutor was able to elicit admissions by expert defense
witnesses that the foundations for their testimony was weaker
than the testimony of expert prosecution witnesses who were able
to examine the skull during the autopsy. 17
Following the appellate division's affirmation of
conviction, the defendant exhumed the victim's body and found
that the skull was buried with other remains, and thus was not
preserved for analysis. 18 The defense medical experts conducted
an examination of the exhumed remains in the presence of
prosecution's forensic experts and representatives, and found that
the victim's injuries did not include a fracture on the front side of
his skull. 19 It was alleged by the defense, without contradiction
by the prosecution, that the bone that had been turned over to the
defense was not related to the infant's skull. 20
The defendant moved to vacate the county court's
judgment and requested a new trial pursuant to the discoveries
made of the victim's skull. 2 1 That motion was denied without a
hearing and the appellate division affirmed the lower court's
decision.22 The court of appeals determined that an inquiry
should be made into whether or not to hold a hearing to
determine three issues: whether the prosecution misrepresented
to the defense that material evidence was preserved and would be
available for examination by defense experts; whether this
evidence should be considered Brady material; and whether a




19. Id. at 127-28, 666 N.E.2d at 222, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
20. Id. at 128, 666 N.E.2d at 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
21. Id. Defendant's motion was based on the following claims: "(I)
misconduct by the District Attorney, (2) newly discovered evidence and (3) the
violation of his constitutional rights, i.e., failure to preserve and deliver Brady
material." Id.
22. Id.
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The court's first step towards making its determination
was setting out the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right
"to discover favorable evidence in the People's possession which
is material to either guilt or punishment" 24 under the Federal and
New York State Constitutions. The court's precedent was an
intersection between federal and state common law. If a demand
for evidence is made, then such evidence is deemed material "if
there is a reasonable probability that had it been disclosed to the
defense, the result would have been different-- i.e., a probability
sufficient to undermine the court's confidence in the outcome of
the trial."25
In Brady v. Maryland,2 6 the petitioner and his partner,
Boblit, were convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death.27 Boblit's statement in which he admitted the
actual murder was withheld from petitioner's counsel after he had
requested to examine Boblit's extra-judicial statements. 28
Petitioner had not become aware of Boblit's statement until after
his conviction, sentencing, and affirmation of his conviction. 29
Petitioner's request for a new trial was based on the discovery of
evidence that had been concealed by the prosecution. 30 The
circuit court of appeals granted a new trial only on the question
of punishment in holding that the suppressed evidence was
grounds for violating the petitioner's right of due process. 3 1 The
sole issue before the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady
24. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d at 128, 666 N.E.2d 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518
(citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
25. Id. (citing People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915,
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990)).
26. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
27. Id. at 84. Petitioner Brady and Boblit were tried separately, with
Brady's trial first. During closing arguments, "Brady's counsel conceded that
Brady was guilty of murder in the first degree, asking only that the jury return
a verdict 'without capital punishment.'" Id. This may have been the reason
that the court of appeals remanded the case for new trial on the punishment,
not guilt. Id. at 85.
28. Id. at 84.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 85.
756 [Vol 13
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was whether the petitioner's constitutional right of due process
was violated when the court of appeals limited the issue for new
trial to punishment only.32  In interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution. "
33
In People v. Vilardi,34 the New York State Court of
Appeals issued an opinion that adheres to the federal
interpretation of the Due Process Clause set out in Brad, v.
Maryland, in that undisclosed Brady material violates a criminal
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right. 35 In
Vilardi, the defendant was convicted on charges of arson in the
first degree and conspiracy to plant and set off one bomb in the
basement of a pizzeria, and another bomb in the basement of a
nearby laundromat. 3 6 The prosecution failed to disclose the first
investigative report of Officer Kiely which stated that there was
no evidence of an explosion, when the prosecution had turned
over twelve other requested reports regarding the laundromat
explosion. 37 At trial, Officer Kiely testified that there was
evidence of an explosion after further investigation. 38 The court
found that the withheld report was "plainly exculpatory" with
respect to the charge of arson.
39
The Vilardi court, however, critically examined United
States v. Bagley40 which set out a lesser standard. 4 1 According
to Bagley the prosecution's omission of favorable evidence is
32. Id.
33. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In an effort to avoid treading on Maryland's
state sovereignty, the Court ultimately affirmed the court of appeals decision to
restrict the issue for new trial to the issue of punishment. Id. at 90.
34. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
35. Id. at 73, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518, 555 N.E.2d at 917.
36. Id. at 70, 555 N.E.2d at 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
37. Id. at 70, 555 N.E.2d at 916, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 72, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
40. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
41. Wilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518, 555 N.E.2d at 920.
19971 757
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"constitutional error ... only if the evidence is material in the
sense that . . . there is a reasonable probability that had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." 42 This federal standard
set out in Bagley was reconciled with the New York standard that
is based on "elemental fairness" to the defendant and the
importance of the prosecution's professional and ethical
obligations. 43 The state common law has adopted a rule of
automatic reversal when the prosecution has failed to disclose
material evidence. 44 Thus the Court of Appeals of New York
opted to secure its concerns of promoting fairness and
discouraging prosecutorial misconduct by declining to comply
with the lesser Bagley standard. 45  The court reasoned that
accepting the "reasonable probability" standard would defer a
jury's impaired decision, due to nondisclosure of material
evidence, to appellate review. 4 6
The post-conviction issue in Bryce was whether the
defendant's constitutional right to due process of law had been
violated when he was denied a hearing to determine whether the
prosecution's failure to preserve and deliver material evidence
mandated a new trial. 47 The court of appeals found that, because
the prosecution misrepresented that material evidence would be
preserved and delivered to the defense, the defendant should have
been afforded a hearing to determine if the newly discovered
evidence was exculpatory and, if so, whether the defendant
should be afforded a new trial. 48
The Federal and New York laws are not in complete
accord with regard to the Due Process rights of defendants
relating to the requisite standards of nondisclosurd by prosecuting
authorities. Under both Federal and New York State
Constitutional law, a criminal defendant's liberty will not be
42. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
43. Viardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 76, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518, 555 N.E.2d at 919.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d. at 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
46. Id.
47. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d. at 128, 666 N.E.2d at 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
48. Id. at 130, 666 N.E.2d at 224, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
758 [Vol 13
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deprived by a state government without the advantage of due
process of law, that is, the defendant is entitled to discover
evidence favorable to his defense with respect t9 either guilt or
punishment.4 9 The difference between federal and state law is a
matter of interpretation: federal common law dictates
undisclosed evidence will be considered material only if a
"reasonable probability" exists that it would have an impact on
the trial's outcome. 50 New York law, in contrast, abides by a
higher standard that requires reversal for any instance in which
the defendant has made a specific request for evidence and the




(decided June 5, 1996)
Defendant, George Scott, was convicted of first degree
manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
and third degree.53 Defendant moved to vacate his conviction
pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10,54 claiming
that the People's failure to disclose specifically requested,
favorable evidence which was material to the verdict [hereinafter
Brady55 evidence] violated the Due Process Clauses of the
49. Id. at 124, 666 N.E.2d at 223, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
50. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
51. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at 77, 555 N.E.2dat 920, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
52. 88 N.Y.2d 888, 667 N.E.2d 923, 644 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1996).
53. Id. at 889, 667 N.E.2d at 924, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
54. N.Y. CRmi. PROC. LAW § 440.10(l)h) (McKinney 1992). Section
440.10 states in pertinent part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon
the ground that: h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of
the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United States.
Id.
55. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady (petitioner) and
Boblit, his companion were found guilty of first degree murder in separate
trials. Id. at 84. At his trial, Brady admitted to participating in the crime, but
he claimed that Boblit did the killing. Id. Before his trial, Brady requested that
7591997]
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